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not, as against a third person, invalidate the sale for technical
procedural defects which, by timely proper objection, could have
averted the sale. On the other hand, as League Central holds, the
debtor's failure at the time to take steps to prevent the loss of
property he may have been unable to pay for anyway, does not
bar him from a defense based upon the impropriety of the sale
when, for the first time, the quite different question is present-
ed of his personal liability for a money judgment beyond the
value of the property. The League Central Credit Union decision
thus provides a rule which protects debtors against abuse
through executory process, without at the same time endanger-
ing the stability of titles gained by third persons through judi-




The broad pre-trial discovery procedures of the Federal
Rules' have not been adopted by most states. Stressing the fact
that full pre-trial discovery was considered and rejected when
the 1966 Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure was drafted, the
Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Hunter2 reaffirmed the
prior Louisiana rule that a defendant is entitled to pre-trial
inspection of his written confession, but refused to broaden the
defendant's right to a full discovery of evidence in possession of
the district attorney. Two 1967-68 decisions further illustrate
the rule that the defendant does not have a right to inspect the
state's evidence in advance of trial. State v. Cardinale3 reiterated
the "firmly established" rule that a defendant is not entitled to
a pre-trial inspection of written confessions of co-defendants,
written statements of witnesses, or police reports in the pos-
session of the district attorney.
4
In State v. Fox5 the Supreme Court applied a "well-settled
rule" that the state is not required to furnish the defendant
with a list of its witnesses. Denial of general discovery rights
to defense counsel is not an arbitrary rule. If discovery were
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16.
2. 250 La. 295, 195 So.2d 273 (1967), discussed in The Work of the Louisi-
ana Appellate Courts for the 1966-1967 Term-Criminal Procedure, 28 LA. L.
REV. 427 (1968).
3. 251 La. 827, 206 So. 2d 510 (1968).
4. Citing numerous cases, id. at 832, 206 So.2d at 512.
5. 251 La. 464, 205 So.2d 42 (1967).
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granted it would be a one-way street, rather than a mutual right
as in civil cases. It is generally felt that the criminal defendant's
privilege against self-incrimination would preclude the state's
corresponding right to demand information as to defenses or
witnesses and their testimony." A further danger of revealing
the names and testimony of state witnesses would be the pos-
sibility of fabricated rebuttal testimony and that steps might
be taken to bribe or intimidate the witnesses into refusing to
testify or testifying falsely. After stating these considerations,
the New Jersey Supreme Court aptly pointed out that "all these
dangers are more inherent in criminal proceedings where the
defendant has more at stake, often his life, than in civil proceed-
ings." 7
It is also well to note, as illustrated by the Supreme Court's
decision in In re Metropolitan Crime Comm'n,8 that the subpoena
duces tecum" may not be used as a discovery device to compel
the production of records over a long period of time which may
or may not have a direct relevancy to the investigation at hand.
IRREGULAR JURY COMMISSION PROCEDURES
Article 419 of the Code of Criminal Procedure continues an
important rule"' which prohibits the setting aside of jury venires
because of irregularities in their composition or in procedures of
the jury commission "unless fraud has been practiced or some
great wrong committed that would work irreparable injury to
the defendant." This provision is based on a recognition of the
fact that jury commissioners are laymen, untrained in the
niceties of the law. As such they are prone to make mistakes,
and will often, although acting in the utmost good faith, fail
to follow the full letter of the law. In State v. Marks1 there had
been a possible departure from the requirement that "the jury
commission shall select" the members of the general venire, 12 in
that names of veniremen were furnished by members from their
respective wards and then automatically approved by the com-
mission. In upholding the procedure followed, Chief Justice
Fournet, who wrote the Supreme Court's majority opinion,
agreed with the trial judge that the general venire list "was the
6. Commonwealth v. Caplan, 411 Pa. 563, 192 A.2d 894 (1963).
7. State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953).
8. 251 La. 518, 205 So.2d 384 (1967).
9. Authorized for criminal cases by LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 732.
10. Former LA. R.S. 15:203 (1950).
11. 252 La. 277, 211 So.2d 261 (1968).
12. LA. CODE CHa-M. P. art. 408.
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result of their [the jury commission's] combined efforts and
approved by them as a whole." The Supreme Court also endorsed
the trial judge's finding that "it is evident that they have tried
their best to select as fair and impartial jury panels as could
possibly be had." Within the wise formula of Article 419, there
was not a showing of fraud or great wrong resulting in ir-
reparable injury.13
Dissenting Justice Barham, after outlining the procedures
followed, argued that "the jury commissioners did not as a group
or individually have any knowledge of the total makeup of the
general venire." He stressed the idea that "the law requires com-
mon deliberation and concerted action by the jury commission in
the selection of the general venire," and concluded that there had
been such a great departure from the prescribed statutory jury
commission procedures that there was "such a great wrong per
se that this court would be irrational to burden the defendant
with the onus of proving fraud or specific irreparable injury.' '14
The case of State v. Newhouse,1 relied upon by Justice Barham,
is distinguishable. In Newhouse the "cut and dried" jury list had
been prepared by a third person who was not a member of the
commission and was under no official oath. In Marks the jury
commission had made an honest effort to perform its function
of preparing a jury list that would provide a fair cross-section
of the community, and had followed a procedure designed to
achieve that end. A common deliberation on each individual
name would probably have been advisable, but there had been
no such departure from the intended procedures as to justify
a finding of fraud or great wrong.
CHANGE OF VENUE--NEW INDICTMENT
The change of venue provisions of the Louisiana Code of
Criminal Procedure 6 are an implementation of the defendant's
"due process" right to a fair trial, and are based on the idea
that a defendant should not be proceeded against in a parish
where there is such prejudice that a fair trial cannot be held.
State v. Alexander 7 involved a problem of change of venue
procedures which, despite its practical significance, was res nova
in Louisiana. After a change of venue had been ordered and
the murder trial transferred from St. Martin Parish (place of
13. 211 So.2d 261, 264 (La. 1968).
14. Id. at 271-272.
15. 29 La. Ann. 824 (1877).
16. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 621-627; authorized by LA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
17. 252 La. 564, 211 So.2d 650 (1968).
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the crime) to St. Mary Parish, the original indictment was
quashed on grounds of racial discrimination in the selection of
the St. Martin Parish grand jury which had returned the indict-
ment. A St. Mary Parish grand jury then re-indicted the de-
fendant for murder, and a principal issue on appeal was whether
the grand jury of the transferee parish had authority to return
the corrective indictment.
In writing the majority opinion for a divided court (4-3)
which upheld the conviction, Justice Sanders stressed the idea
that after a change of venue the offense was triable and all fu-
ture procedures should be had in the parish to which the case was
transferred. Concerning the authority of the St. Mary Parish
grand jury, he stressed the grand jury's specific authority to in-
quire into all crimes "triable within the parish."' 8 The complete
authority of the transferee parish was shown by the special
change of venue rule that when a case is ordered removed, "it
shall be heard, tried and determined in the same manner as if the
proceedings had originally been instituted therein."",
Dissenting Justice Barham took the position that this lan-
guage should be literally construed to mean that only the hearing
and trial should proceed as if the proceedings had originated in
the second parish. It is submitted that the import and purpose
of former R.S. 15:296, which was relied upon by Justice Sanders,
was to make it clear that when a case is transferred all future
proceedings are to be conducted in the transferee parish. This
intent is stated even more clearly in corresponding Article 624
of the 1966 Code of Criminal Procedure which provides that the
transferred case "shall be proceeded with in the same manner as
if the proceedings had originally been instituted therein."
An additional practical reason for adopting the majority
view that the new parish court should have complete control of
further action in the case is that an indictment returned by a
grand jury of the new parish will probably represent a fairer
and more detached appraisal of the sufficiency of the charge
against the defendant than another indictment returned by a
grand jury of the parish where sentiment ran so high that a fair
trial could not be had.'-
18. Citing former LA. R.S. 15:209 (1950).
19. Citing id. 15:296.
20. Concurring Justice Hamlin suggests this when he states: "Reason dic-
tates that if the trial judge is reversed and another indictment is returned in St.
Martin Parish, another motion to quash will be filed on the ground that the
indictment is null because it will have been found by a biased and prejudiced
Grand Jury. If the motion is granted, is the accused to be set free?" 211 So.2d
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Justice Sanders' majority opinion does not deal with the
related question of whether the grand jury of the original parish
could have re-indicted the defendant. It would appear that this
question, when presented, might well be answered in the negative.
CONFESSIONS
The 1966 Code of Criminal Procedure adopted an entirely new
approach to the former requirement of reference to confessions
in the opening statement. Article 767 prohibits any reference to a
confession or inculpatory statement in the district attorney's
opening statement. From the defendant's standpoint, substantial
damage has been done when the jury is told that the defendant
made a confession or other inculpatory statement which later
proves inadmissible in evidence. At the same time the defendant
cannot properly prepare to meet the issue unless he is apprised
of the state's intention to use the confession or inculpatory state-
ment. Thus, Article 768 requires the state to advise the defense,
in writing prior to the opening statement, of its intention to in-
troduce the confession or inculpatory statement. Failure to give
such notice renders the confession inadmissible in evidence.2 1
The new Code procedures were designed to preclude possible
prejudice to the defense, and also to avoid the troublesome prob-
lem as to just how detailed an opening statement reference to the
confession should be.2 2 This intended simple non-technical ap-
proach was understandingly implemented by the Louisiana Su-
preme Court in State v. Palmer2 3 where timely notice had been
given, but defense counsel contended that the state gave notice
of an "inculpatory statement" but introduced a "confession." It
was argued that the notice had failed to conform with the type
of admission which was ultimately introduced in evidence. In
rejecting this hyper-technical claim of variance, Justice Sum-
mers stated, "Although the quoted statement certainly could be
considered as a confession, we do not feel that the lawmakers
intended to cast upon the State the obligation of making a defini-
tive analysis of the testimony it sought to introduce. What the
article contemplates is that if the introduction is either an in-
culpatory statement or a confession, notice should be given. '24
It is the giving of notice that a self-incriminatory statement is
at 664. It may be possible to select a grand jury which can withstand constitu-
tional attack, but the prejudicial atmosphere can be completely avoided by pre-
senting the corrective true bill to a grand jury in the second parish.
21. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 703, comment (f).
22. See id. art. 769, comment (b).
23. 251 La. 759, 206 So.2d 485 (1968).
24. Id. at 766, 206 So.2d at 487.
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used, rather than the label attached to such statement, which is
sacramental to protection of the defendant's rights under Article
768.
INSTRUCTION TO JURY RE SPECIFIC INTENT
The court's charge to the jury is a historic and fundamental
feature of the jury trial. It serves to enlighten the jury, com-
posed of laymen, as to the law to be applied in the case being
tried. This important aspect of the trial is fully provided for in
the Code of Criminal Procedure,25 and Article 802 includes a
requirement that the judge shall charge the jury "as to the law
applicable to the case." This necessarily includes instruction as
to all elements of the crime charged. Frequently this is accom-
plished by reading pertinent articles of the Criminal Code. Un-
der Article 807 the state and the defendant may request special
charges; but such charges need not be given if they require
qualification, are not wholly correct, or if the matter is already
included in the general charge.
A significant and controversial issue in State v. Schoonover2 6
was whether the defendant in an armed robbery trial was en-
titled to a special instruction as to the Criminal Code meaning
of "specific intent.' 27 In its general charge, the court had in-
structed the jury in the language of the armed robbery and
theft articles of the Criminal Code, 2 which provide a statement
of the elements of the crime of armed robbery.29 In upholding
the trial court's refusal of a special charge as to the nature of
the specific intent which is essential to theft or robbery, the
Supreme Court pointed out that the judge's general charge had
made it clear that an intent to deprive the other permanently
of the thing taken was essential to the crime of armed robbery.
Dissenting Justice Barham maintained that the trial judge
was under a further obligation, at least when specially requested,
to define specific intent as distinguished from a general intent.
"Without the definition or instruction as to specific intent,"
stated Justice Barham, "the jury in the instant case determined
guilt under a charge which used such general terms as 'intent'
and 'intentional'. The jury could have determined that 'the cir-
cumstances indicated that the offender, in the ordinary course
of human experience, must have adverted to the prescribed crim-
25. LA. CODE CRIx. P. arts. 801-808.
26. 252 La. 211, 211 So.2d 273 (1968).
27. LA. R.S. 14:10(2) (1950).
28. Id. 14:65, 67.
29. Armed robbery is an aggravated form of theft-accomplished by force
and when armed with a dangerous weapon.
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inal consequences as reasonably certain to result from his act
or failure to act.' A verdict so predicated upon 'general criminal
intent' would be illegal, erroneous and unjust. ' 30 The distinction
between specific criminal intent (essential to theft and robbery)
and general criminal intent is an important one which is clearly
stated in Article 10 of the Criminal Code.31
Where a crime, like theft or robbery, requires a specific in-
tent, the defendant should be entitled, as Justice Barham con-
tends, to a specific instruction as to the precise legal nature of
such an intent. The best way to phrase such an instruction is in
conformity with the language of the Criminal Code definition,
and this had been done in the requested special instruction.
CHARGE ON CONSPIRACY IN TRIAL OF MULTIPLE
DEFENDANTS
In State v. Skinner32 the Louisiana Supreme Court disposed
of fourteen bills of exceptions with expertise, conciseness, and
clarity. There was one issue, however, where some unnecessarily
broad statements may result in obfuscation, rather than clari-
fication, unless the court's actual holding is carefully kept in
mind. That was the much-discussed bill of exceptions number 29
which challenged the propriety of the trial judge's elaborate
charge on the law of conspiracy.
In Skinner three defendants were jointly charged, tried and
convicted for the illegal possession and sale of narcotics. It is
significant that the defendants were not charged or on trial
for a criminal conspiracy to possess and sell narcotics;13 and it
was recognized by the Supreme Court that a joint charge against
several of committing an offense does not operate as a charge
of criminal conspiracy, which "is a separate and distinct of-
fense from the completed crime. ' '13 In such a case the separate
30. 211 So.2d 261, 281 (La. 1968).
31. LA. R.S. 14:10 (Criminal Intent) (1950).
"Criminal intent may be specific or general.
"(1) Specific criminal intent is that state of mind which exists when
the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed
criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act.
"(2) General criminal intent is present whenever there is specific in-
tent, and also when the circumstances indicate that the offender, in the
ordinary course of human experience, must have adverted to the prescribed
criminal consequences as reasonably certain to result from his act or failure
to act."
32. 251 La. 300, 204 So.2d 370 (1967).
33. LA. R.S. 14:26 (Criminal Conspiracy) (1950).
34. State v. Gunter, 208 La. 694, 23 So.2d 305, quoted at 251 La. 300, 311,
204 So.2d 374 (1968).
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offense of criminal conspiracy, unlike the lesser included of-
fense of attempt,35 would not be a responsive verdict.
While conspiracy is not a responsive verdict, the existence
of a conspiracy or combination may have other relevance to the
case where multiple defendants are charged with joint commis-
sion of a crime. Thus, Justice Sanders, who dissented at the
original hearing, pointed out and cited authorities for the prop-
osition that "it is well settled that when multiple defendants are
charged with a substantive offense, evidence is admissible at
the trial of a conspiracy to commit the crime charged .... When
such evidence has been offered, the Court may properly give an
instruction to the jury pertaining to conspiracy between the
defendants, although the indictment or bill of information does
not charge conspiracy. ' 3 ; Justice Hamiter's majority opinion
aptly pointed out that the better form of instruction would be
concerning the liability as "principals" of those who aid and
abet a crime.3 Nevertheless, there is sound authority for de-
nominating the joint participants as "conspirators. ' 3
Even clearer support for the giving of a charge on con-
spiracy was found in the evidence rule-" that the jury may con-
sider acts and declarations of a co-defendant in the furtherance
of their common criminal enterprise as binding on a defendant,
but only if "a prima facie case of conspiracy" has been estab-
lished.40
For the purposes stated above, it would appear that a con-
spiracy charge will be appropriate in some cases where several
defendants are jointly tried for the basic offense, but have not
been charged with the separate crime of criminal conspiracy4 1
However, the Skinner opinion should be construed with care and
not unduly extended. There are some unduly broad dicta state-
ments in the various opinions of the Supreme Court Justices,
such as Justice Hawthorne's statement that "it was the duty
of the court to charge the jury fully as to the law of conspiracy
in this case, as the defendant is jointly charged with murder,
35. LA. R.S. 14:27 (1950).
36. 251 La. 300, 321-22, 204 So.2d 370, 377 (3.967).
37. Id. at 317, 204 So.2d at 376. See LA. R.S. 14:24 (Principals) (1950).
38. See authorities cited in Justice Hamlin's opinion on rehearing, 251 La.
300, 364-66, 204 So.2d 370, 393 (1967).
39. LA. CODE CRT.M. P. art. 455.
40. See Justice Hawthorne's dissent at original hearing, 251 La. 300, 323,
204 So.2d 370, 378 (1967).
41. They could not 'be charged with both the basic offense and criminal con-
spiracy in the same indictment in view of the general joinder prohibition of LA.
CODE CRIM. P. art. 493.
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and the indictment necessarily involves conspiracy. ' 42 Similarly,
Justice Hamlin broadly states, in his majority opinion on a re-
hearing, "it has been held under the jurisprudence of this court
that where an indictment charges that the crime was committed
by two or more persons, such an indictment necessarily involves
a conspiracy, ' '4 3 and concurring Justice McCaleb declares that
it "is well settled that the judge is obliged to give a charge on
conspiracy in prosecutions for a crime committed by two or
more persons." 44 These statements, when read in the light of
the facts of Skinner and the opinion as a whole, assume much
less sweeping proportions.
Actually, trial judges would be wise to be more specific and
not phrase their conspiracy instructions in the broad fashion
that was employed by the trial judge in Skinner. In general, it
would be much clearer to phrase instructions in terms of the
principal article of the Criminal Code, and when the special
evidence rule is to be invoked the instruction should follow the
pattern of that rule. In any event, the instruction should make
it clear that the defendants were not being charged with the
separate crime of criminal conspiracy.
HABEAS CORPUS
The American Bar Association's tentative draft of "Stand-
ards Relating to Post-Conviction Remedies" stresses the need
for more complete state procedures for post-conviction review,
and recommends the standards for such review. An increasing
number of states have recently adopted special post-conviction
statutes, or extended their post-conviction relief by an expansion
of the habeas corpus remedy. 45 Rather than set up an elaborate
post-conviction remedy, the Louisiana Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure of 1966 revised Louisiana's habeas corpus procedures and
expanded the remedy to include such basic defenses as double
jeopardy, time limitations, and the defendant's conviction "with-
out due process of law." Violation of "due process" requirements
is a ground for relief in all complete post-conviction procedures.46
42. 251 La. 300, 325, 204 So.2d 370, 379 (1967).
43. Id. at 365, 204 So.2d at 393.
44. Id. at 369, 204 So.2d at 394.
45. Tentative Draft, American Bar Association Project on Minimum Stand-
ards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Post-Conviction Remedies. See
Commentary 23-97 and Appendix C: Table of Post Conviction Acts 112.
46. See A.B.A. Standards. "2.1 Grounds for relief.
"A post-conviction remedy ought to be sufficiently broad to provide relief
"(a) for meritorious claims challenging judgments of convictions, in-
cluding claims:
"(i) that the conviction was obtained or sentence imposed in violation
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Two important considerations led to the inclusion of "convic-
tion without due process of law" in Louisiana's expanded habeas
corpus remedy. All courts, state and federal alike, are interested
in making sure that fundamental due process shall be followed
in criminal trials, and it is desirable to provide defendants with
a prompt state remedy where due process has been denied. It
was also hoped, as was pointed out in the Law Institute's Com-
ment 47 that providing a state post-conviction remedy would re-
duce the necessity of federal intervention.
The new Louisiana habeas corpus procedure has certain
built-in safeguards against clogging court dockets with frivolous
claims or with a reiteration of claims that have already been
fully considered in prior proceedings in the case. Under Article
354 the writ will not be granted and the petition dismissed with-
out a hearing where the application is patently unfounded and
without substance.
Just such a case was presented in State of Louisiana ex rel.
Barksdale v. Dees, Acting Warden, Louisiana State Penitenti-
ary.48 In Barksdale the petitioner had been convicted of aggra-
vated rape and sentenced to death. The conviction and sentence
were affirmed by the Louisiana Supreme Court and the United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari. The state opposed an
application for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the
petition was insufficient on its face, since all grounds presented
either had been passed upon on the trial of the merits or were
untenable under the law. The trial court overruled the state's
opposition and the Louisiana Supreme Court issued a writ of
certiorari to review the trial court's ruling.49 After reviewing
the grounds urged in petitioner's application, the Supreme Court
concluded that there had been "no denial of due process" and
that the application should be "denied and dismissed without a
hearing."
of the Constitution of the United States or the constitution or laws of the
state in which the judgment was rendered; .... "
In accord with this standard the Georgia Habeas Corpus Act of 1967 (Ga.
Act 562 of 1967) provides a new Code section 50-127 which authorizes a prisoner
to bring a writ of habeas corpus on the ground "that in the proceedings which
resulted in his conviction there was a substantial denial of his rights under the
Constitution of the United States or of the State of Georgia or the laws of the
State of Georgia .. "
47. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 362, comment (i) (4) and (j).
48. 252 La. 434, 211 So.2d 318 (1968).
49. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 369, comment continues the former procedure
whereby review of district court habeas corpus rulings are by discretionary writ,
rather than by appeal.
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Petitioner's main claim was racial discrimination, alleging
that there had been a systematic exclusion of all but a token
number of Negroes from the grand jury and petit jury venire
of Orleans Parish. In overruling this contention, the Supreme
Court pointed out that "these identical issues were passed upon
on the merits by the district court, the Louisiana Supreme Court
and the United States Supreme Court on Barksdale's trial, ap-
peal and application for certiorari."5 0 It would be a perversion
of the writ of habeas corpus to use the device as a vehicle for
reconsideration of issues which previously have been fully con-
sidered and finally determined. 51 If substantial new evidence or
issues had been presented in the habeas corpus application, the
interests of justice would have dictated that they should be con-
sidered. No such new evidence or substantial new issue was pre-
sented in Barksdale.
The other alleged grounds were without any real merit and
were properly overruled, with brief treatment, in Justice Bar-
ham's opinion.
In a final analysis, the application for a wirt of habeas
corpus was insufficient on its face and should have been dis-
missed by the trial judge. For the same reasons, the Supreme
Court, acting in its general supervisory capacity, was justified
in ordering the writ dismissed.
Justice Barham's opinion in Barksdale also raises a question,
by way of dictum, as to the effectiveness of state habeas corpus
remedies to reduce federal review of state convictions on "due
process" grounds. Justice Barham suggests that "any attempt
by a state to preclude federal intervention by providing its own
post-conviction review of federally-based claims will merely es-
tablish state court services to be supervised and superintended
by the federal district court." 5' This statement may be open to
question, since there are indications that federal courts will take
notice of (and often defer to) state court procedures if they
feel the remedy is "swift and imperative." In Mobley v. Dutton 3
for example, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, noting that
50. "This court thoroughly disposed of all the arguments made by petitioner
in regard to systematic exclusion in selection of jurors in State v. Barksdale, 247
La. 198, 170 So.2d 374, 379-384. This court, with Mr. Justice Summers as its
organ, discussed these issues at length and in detail, and found no planned sys-
tematic discrimination." 211 So.2d 318, 324 (La. 1968).
51. See A.B.A. STANDARDS § 6.1(a), which ascribes finality to grounds for
post-conviction relief "which have been fully and finally litigated in the proceed-
ings leading to the judgment of conviction."
52. 211 So.2d 318, 322 (La. 1968).
53. 380 F.2d 14 (5th Cir. 1967).
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Georgia had recently instituted a new post-conviction remedy,
decided to hold petitioner's application for habeas corpus in
abeyance until the new Georgia remedy could be tried. The same
"hold-in-abeyance" attitude toward new state post-conviction
remedies can be found in a number of other cases in widely
divergent geographical areas, including the courts of appeals in
the third, ninth and tenth circuits.5 4
It is true that in some circuits the federal courts have taken
a negative approach, announcing that unless the state demon-
strates a "swift and imperative" remedy, federal courts will
grant application for habeas corpus."5 At present, the effective-
ness of state "due process" remedies is, at the worst, an open
question; and it would be premature to jettison the "due process"
ground from Louisiana's expanded post-conviction remedy.
The guiding principle in this matter should, hopefully, be the
one enunciated in Fay v. Noia, where Mr. Justice Brennan stated
that, "it would be unseemly in our dual system of government
for a federal district court to upset a state court conviction
without an opportunity for the state courts to correct a consti-




"No Doubt at All"
What is the burden of proof required to change an entry on
a birth certificate as to race? State ex rel. Pritchard v. Louisiana
State Board of Health' was an action brought by a person
designated as "colored" on her birth certificate to correct it to
reflect that she is a member of the white race. The court con-
sidered "established" that relator had "lived as a white person"
54. In Hill v. Dutton, 277 F. Supp. 324 (N.D. Ga. 1967), the court agreed
that "Georgia has equipped itself with flexible adequate tools to meet Georgia's
responsibility in the vindication of federal constitutional rights in the trial of
criminal cases. This is where it belongs. The role of the Federal Courts will be,
as it should be, more and more reduced." Id. at 326. See also United States
ex rel. Singer v. Myers, 384 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1967); United States ex rel.
Walker v. Young, 388 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1967) ; Kennell v. Crouse, 384 F.2d 811
(10th Cir. 1967) ; Childress v. Beto, 273 F. Supp. 401 (S.D. Tex. 1967) ; Knox
v. Maxwell, 277 F. Supp. 593 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
55. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Harper v. Rundle, 278 F. Supp. 819 (E.D.
Pa. 1968) ; United States ex rel. Shelton v. Rundle, 279 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D. Pa.
1967).
56. 372 U.S. 391, 419-20 (1963).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 198 So.2d 490 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
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